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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between nationalism, state 
formation, and the marginalisation of national minorities through an 
historical focus on Pakistani state’s relationship with the Ahmadiyya 
community, a self-defined minority sect of Islam. In 1974, a constitutional 
amendment was enacted that effectively rendered the Ahmadiyya 
community a non-Muslim minority, in spite of claims by the community 
that it was Muslim and hence not a minority. This paper attempts to 
account for this anti-Ahmadiyya state legislation by arguing that the 
genealogy of the idea of a Pakistani state is key for understanding 
the politics of exclusion of the Ahmadiyya community from ‘Muslim 
citizenship’ – that is, who is and isn’t a Muslim. 
Introduction
This paper explores the relationship between nationalism, state formation, 
and the marginalisation of national minorities. In the literature on the nation 
and nationalism, the relationship between state formation and nationalist 
exclusions is often under-theorised, with the implicit assumption made 
that processes of nation building occur independently of the construction 
of state institutions. Many works have shown the pitfalls of this neglect by 
demonstrating that the articulation of nationalist ideologies, and the processes 
which take place in the national community as a result of such nationalisms, 
are either aided by, or are articulated in response to, the formation of state 
institutions and practices of social closure (Brubaker 1992; Balibar 2004; 
Omi and Winant 1994). 
In this paper, I revisit the debate on the relationship between nationalism and 
state-formation through a consideration of the Pakistani state’s historically 
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varying relationship with its Islamic politico-religious identity. The empirical 
focus of this paper is the historical background of the second constitutional 
amendment of Pakistan, enacted in 1974, which in effect rendered the 
Ahmadiyya community, a self-identified minority sect of Islam with roughly 
2 million adherents in Pakistan, outside the pale of Islam by institutionalising 
its status as a ‘non-Muslim minority’, despite the insistence of the Ahmadiyya 
community that it was Muslim, and therefore not a non-Muslim minority.1 
This amendment is a critical chapter in the history of state formation in 
modern Pakistan as it gave a new definition of the national community by 
equating the nation with Islam. 
In what follows, I attempt to achieve the following three objectives: first, 
I will briefly lay out the theoretical core of the paper with regard to the 
relationship between states and exclusionary dimensions of nationalism. 
Second, I will give a historical account of the genealogy of what is popularly 
termed ‘the Ahmadi question’ in Pakistan by identifying three crucial 
moments in the state’s relationship with the community. Lastly, I will 
examine the state’s response to anti-Ahmadiyya demands in 1974 when 
the second constitutional amendment was enacted. In this paper, I seek to 
account for how and why the Pakistani state forcibly evicted the Ahmadiyya 
sect from the community of Islam. I suggest that the genealogy of the idea 
of the Pakistani state is key for understanding the politics of exclusion of the 
Ahmadiyya community from ‘Muslim citizenship’, that is, who is and isn’t 
a Muslim. The shifting bases of Pakistani nationalism from 1954 to 1974 
led to changes in the Pakistani state, which in turn led to the construction of 
new social imaginaries through which the very idea of the Pakistani nation-
state was discursively and institutionally (re-) articulated. 
State Theory and the Formation of National Identities 
Nationalism is typically viewed normatively as a necessary evil in the modern 
world, sanctioning as it does various forms of exclusions and hierarchies, 
both internal and external to the territorial state (Kedourie 1960; Chatterjee 
1993; Balibar 2004). In contrast to this view, another differentiates between 
two versions of nationalism: liberal, or civic nationalism vs. illiberal, ethnic, 
or religious nationalism (Kohn 1944; Plamenatz 1976; Ignatieff 1994). While 
the former is found in open, pluralistic societies, and is characterised by a 
commitment to values of liberty, equality, sanctity of individual rights, and 
democracy, regardless of class or ethnic identifications, illiberal nationalism 
is found in closed, authoritarian societies and rejects the principles of Western 
Enlightenment grounded in rationality, favouring instead identifications with 
class, ethnic or racial communities. 
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Both these schools of thought give primacy to the form and content of 
nationalisms, thereby locating the evils present in nationalisms in the 
ideological nature of their content. In all these theories, the existence of the state 
is implicitly taken for granted and is the necessary condition for the emergence 
of nationalisms. This lack of theorisation on the relationship between national-
cultural formations and state-building, however, is suspect, and was also 
present in neo-Weberian theories of state formation that emerged in the late 
1970s and 1980s (e.g. Tilly 1985; Skocpol 1979; Mann 1986). Drawing a 
sharp distinction between the cultural and the political spheres, neo-Weberian 
theories implicitly rendered the former as subservient to the latter. 
However, this line of theorisation occludes the ways in which processes of 
state-formation occur through appropriations of cultural idioms (Anderson 
1991; Appadurai 1981; Brubaker 1992); and second, it ignores that the 
state itself is a social construction and a cultural formation (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005; Steinmetz 1999). The very elusiveness of the idea of the 
state, and the difficulty of identifying it with anyone or anything in particular 
(Runciman 2003), sets the ground from which the state seeks to constitute 
itself as a sovereign entity through symbolic and discursive representations 
that function to define and stabilise the very meaning of sovereign power 
and authority, though these meanings vary historically (Weber 1995). In this 
conceptualisation, the state is both as a system – ‘a palpable nexus of practice 
and institutional structure’, and an idea – a historically constructed and 
contested ‘exercise in legitimation, in moral regulation’ (Abrams 1988:82, 
81; Mitchell 1999). I propose that the state be studied as, simultaneously, 
a coercion-yielding entity, essentially characterised by its ability to 
maintain a monopoly over the use of violence; as a cultural institution of 
moral regulation encapsulated within historically constructed yet enduring 
narratives about the state; and a sociological institution wherein groups and 
individuals with particular class, religious, and social interests vie with each 
other for power, authority, and/or legitimacy (Weber 1978; Corrigan and 
Sayer 1985). Theories that either tend to primordialise the nation, or view 
the emergence of nationalisms and their attendant exclusions independently 
of processes of state formation, elide the way mechanisms of state building, 
nation formation, and construction of national ‘others’ are conjoined, and 
how interactions among them give historically varying responses to the very 
basis of ‘national identity’. 
Recently, a growing body of literature has convincingly revealed how 
identities, attachments, and minorities are culturally and politically created, 
changing in time and place (e.g. Chatterjee 1993; Alonso 1994; Burguiere 
and Grew 2001; Kemper 1991; Van der Veer 1994). However, in contrast 
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to Western European countries where understandings of citizenship and 
nationhood and processes of state-building have developed organically 
and culturally over the course of centuries (Brubaker 1992; Corrigan and 
Sayer 1985), similar processes in postcolonial countries have spanned much 
shorter time periods and have entailed, on the one hand, construction of 
new ‘citizens’ that were formerly relegated to the status of ‘subjects’ under 
colonial rule (Mamdani 1996), and on the other, continuation of colonial 
idioms of rule, often premised on the routinisation of violence (Chatterjee 
2005; Pandey 2006). These states have, in other words, actively undertaken 
the task of the construction of the ‘nation form’. Categories and distinctions 
of caste, religion, and ethnicities that were constructed under colonial rule 
survived into the post-colonial period had now to be re-negotiated afresh. I 
contend that it is in this re-negotiation of the boundaries of the nation that 
new social imaginaries of the nation-state are constructed, which in turn 
shape state practices and institutions of social closure through which the 
cultural inscription of the very idea of a sovereign state is secured. 
The Pakistani State and the Genealogy  
of the ‘Ahmadi Question’
The fundamental doctrinal difference between Ahmadis and Sunni Muslims, 
on the basis of which the Ahmadiyya community has historically been 
deemed heretical by orthodox Sunni Muslims, concerns the status of the 
founder of the Ahmadiyya sect, Ghulam Mirza Ahmad, who lived from 
1835 to 1908 in the city of Qadian in colonial Punjab. The majority of Sunni 
Muslims believe that Mirza Ahmad was an apostate who claimed for himself 
Khatam-e-Nubuwwat, or, the status of the last divine prophet. Traditionally, 
Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet to be sent on 
Earth by God, thereby holding the seal of prophecy, a belief that holds central 
place among Islamic religious precepts and any suggestion to the contrary 
is perceived to be blasphemous. The opinion among the Ahmadis on the 
status of Mirza Ahmad differs.2  While one prominent group, headed by the 
Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya (based initially in the city of Rabwah in Pakistan and 
presently in London, U.K.) believes Ghulam Mirza to be a divine prophet 
who had heard and responded to divine revelation, the other, popularly 
termed the Lahori Jamaat because of the group’s establishment in the city 
of Lahore in Pakistan, denies this charge and claims that Ghulam Mirza was 
merely a sacred and holy man of God without having prophetic status. In 
popular mainstream narratives, however, such internal distinctions are often 
overlooked and all Ahmadis collectively referred to as Mirzais (followers 
of Mirza) or Qadianis (from Qadian), words that have over time taken on 
intensely derogatory connotations. 
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The constitutional amendment of 1974 was a clear departure from the 
Pakistani state’s earlier stance towards the larger issue of the state’s role 
in the definition of the boundaries of Muslim citizenship. Anti-Ahmadiyya 
movements have a long history in Pakistan. Even before the creation of 
Pakistan, right-wing religious groups, most notably Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam , 
were agitating against the Ahmadis, portraying them as heretics.3 However, 
when Muhammad Ali Jinnah, considered the founder of Pakistan and who 
later became the country’s first Governor-General, was asked to comment on 
the religious status of the Ahmadiyya community by a journalist during a press 
conference in 1944, three years prior to the independence of Pakistan, Mr. 
Jinnah observed, ‘Who am I to declare a person non-Muslim who calls himself 
a Muslim?’4  By popular Ahmadi accounts, Jinnah invited the community to 
migrate to Pakistan at the time of the partition, and assured the Ahmadis that 
their rights as full citizens of Pakistan would be fully protected.5  
In independent Pakistan, the demand that the Ahmadiyya community be 
declared non-Muslim was first publicly made in 1949 by the Ahrar in public 
meetings throughout the province of Punjab, with the support of numerous 
religious organisations. Earlier the same year, the Ahrar Party announced 
that it was changing its status from a political establishment to a religious 
one, declaring at the same time its allegiance with the Muslim League, the 
ruling party in the province of Punjab, in all political matters (Lahore High 
Court 1954:13). Perhaps the most important event that explains the timing 
of the Ahrar demands is the passing of the Objectives Resolution in March 
1949, a resolution on the ‘Aims and Objects of the Constitution’, akin to a 
preamble. The Resolution and the debates surrounding this Resolution are 
of immense importance for situating these anti-Ahmadiyya demands. While 
the Resolution refrained from naming Pakistan an ‘Islamic state’, it began 
by vesting ‘sovereignty over the entire universe’ to God, and clearly laid 
down that it was a state ‘Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order 
their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the 
teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunnah’. In the very next sentence, the Resolution goes on to assert that the 
rights of all minorities with regard to freedom of faith, association, cultural 
expression, and equality would be fully protected. During the Constituent 
Assembly debates on the Resolution prior to its passing, the non-Muslim 
members of the Constituent Assembly raised vehement objections with 
regard to the usage of Islamic terminology in the Resolution, and proposed a 
number of amendments that would further safeguard the rights of minorities 
in Pakistan. The motion to amend the Objectives Resolution was denied 
(Khan 2005). 
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The allegiance of the state to Islam at this crucial moment gave the Ahrar 
leadership impetus to make their anti-Ahmadiyya demands public (Nasr 
1994). However, at this moment, despite the state’s nominal affiliation 
with the symbols of Islam in the Objectives Resolution, the state remained 
committed to protecting the fundamental rights of all religious minorities, 
and deemed the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign of the Ahrar unlawful (Lahore 
High Court 1954). 
Anti-Ahmadiyya agitation broke out again in 1953 in the province of 
Punjab, again led by the Ahrar, but this time with the support of the ruling 
party in Punjab, in particular its Chief Minister Mumtaz Daultana, and the 
Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami. On 21st January 1953, an ultimatum 
was delivered to the Prime Minister of Pakistan by a delegation of ulama 
(religious leaders) to the effect that if the state did not declare the Ahmadiyya 
community non-Muslim and remove all Ahmadis from key posts in the 
state, their parent organisation, Majlis-i-Amal, would resort to direct action 
against the government. A little over a month later, the government rejected 
the ultimatum and authorised the arrest of prominent members of Majlis-i-
Amal. In the wake of widespread anti-Ahmadiyya agitation and violence that 
ensued, the state authorised the arrest of prominent religious members, most 
notably Maulana Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, and another of 
its prominent members, Maulana Kausar Niazi. Both were later charged with 
treason and imprisoned for inciting violent sectarian feelings through giving 
public speeches and distributing objectionable literature (Ali 2002:178). 
The state ultimately declared Pakistan’s first Martial Law over the city of 
Lahore, and proceeded to violently repress right-wing agitators. In 1954, 
the committee set up by the state to inquire into the disturbances noted in its 
final report the importance of the question of Muslim identity for the newly 
formed Pakistani state but concluded that question of who was and wasn’t 
a Muslim was almost impossible to decide, further noting that the ulama 
themselves ‘hopelessly disagreed among themselves’ on this fundamental 
question (Lahore High Court 1954:205).The report forcefully upheld the 
importance of individual conscience in religious matters along with that 
of full citizenship rights, and declared that the riots had been instigated 
by radical Islamic groups in conjunction with the ruling party in Punjab to 
deliberately cause disturbances. I term this moment in the genealogy of the 
relationship between the Ahmadiyya community and Pakistani state as the 
moment of accommodation. 
The ‘Ahmadi question’ emerged on the national scene again in 1974. On 30th 
July 1974, all major newspapers reported that a group of 160 non-Ahmadi 
Muslim students of Nishtar Medical College, Multan (NMC) were attacked 
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on the Train Station at the city of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town, 
by thousands of Ahmadis. According to the newspaper, the crowd was armed 
with sticks, knives, and swords, and proceeded to attack and beat the students, 
injuring 30 in the process. During the subsequent investigations, the number 
of attackers and those hurt, and the nature and the reasons for the attack would 
come under inquiry. However, it was acknowledged by all that on 22nd May, 
when the same students had stopped at Rabwah train station, there had been 
some minor skirmish between a group of Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi students, 
with the former claiming that anti-Ahmadiyya slogans had been shouted 
without provocation, and the latter denying those claims. 
In response to the incident, acts of violence against the Ahmadiyya 
community started immediately, especially in the province of Punjab. At 
various university campuses, Ahmadi students were forcibly thrown out 
of their hostel rooms, their belongings collected and set on fire. Ahmadi 
shopkeepers in markets and bazaars started receiving threatening phone 
calls while enraged crowds stoned and burned Ahmadiyya shops, gas 
stations, and factories. Incidents of beatings of Ahmadis were reported 
which, according to official reports, also led to forty-two murders, of which 
twenty-seven were reported to be of Ahmadis (Dawn Newspaper, Karachi: 
23rd June 1974). Violence against the Ahmadiyya community came to an 
end within a week, largely because of willingness on the part of the state to 
use force to curb violence. However, a propaganda campaign was launched, 
with major Islamist political parties, religious organisations, student and 
trade unions; as well as members of opposition parties in the national 
and provincial assemblies, and public intellectuals publicly demanding 
that the government declare the Ahmadiyya community a non-Muslim 
minority; remove all Ahmadis from key positions in state institutions; and 
that it declare Rabwah, alleged a ‘state within a state’ run by the despotic 
descendents of Ghulam Mirza Ali, an ‘open city’. Additionally, a nation-
wide movement was launched that advocated the social boycotting of the 
Ahmadiyya community. The following announcement that appeared on the 
front page of Nawa-e-Waqt, a major national newspaper that supports the 
religious Right, is typical of the scores of statements and announcements 
that were being sent in to and published by newspapers:
It is the Religious Duty of all Muslims 
That the Deniers of the Finality of the Prophethood of Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH), 
the Qadianis, be completely boycotted, 
That they [the Muslims] maintain no relationships with them [the 
‘Qadianis’] and do not buy and sell products made by them.
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We strongly demand from the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto that he, without delay, 
Declare the Qadianis a non-Muslim minority 
And on the Day of Judgment, with the Shafa’at [intercession] of the Last 
of the Prophets PBUH, earn a high place in Heaven. 
From: President Wholesale Cloth Association, Gujranwala 
And Khwaja Cloth Market, Insaaf Cloth Market, Khaqwani Cloth 
Market, Madina Cloth Market […etc]
(Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 16th June 1974,  
translated by author)
In response to anti-Ahmadi violence and propaganda, the state immediately 
sprang to attention in a bid to retain its loosening grip on what it called ‘the 
law and order’ situation.6  Over the course of a few days, the government 
started curbing anti-Ahmadi processions, arresting prominent student 
and religious leaders on the grounds that they were fuelling sectarian and 
communal riots, and placed a ban on the publishing of sectarian news. The 
state also arrested seventy-one Ahmadis for their alleged involvement in the 
attack of 29th May and appointed a Lahore High Court judge to investigate 
the incident and submit his findings. 
On 13th June, in response to the call for a General Strike by right-wing 
religious organisations, Bhutto in a televised speech announced that the 
Ahmadi issue would be placed before the National Assembly for deliberation 
(Dawn Newspaper, Karachi: 14th June 1974). Bhutto was urged to take 
this course of action by his Minister of Information, Kausar Niazi, the 
same man who had been behind the 1954 anti-Ahmadiyya agitations, then 
a member of the Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami, and in 1974 of Bhutto’s 
People’s Party. The National Assembly was subsequently converted into 
a Special Committee which debated the issue of whether the Ahmadiyya 
community was a Muslim or not, and called the various heads of Ahmadiyya 
organisations to present their views and to answer questions posed by 
members. The exact proceedings of these deliberations have not been made 
public to this day. The Ahmadiyya community was unanimously declared a 
non-Muslim minority and the second constitutional amendment passed by 
the National Assembly on 7th September. I call this phase the moment of 
exclusion with regard to the relation between the state and the Ahmadiyya 
community. 
It was this moment of nationalist exclusion that set the grounds for a 
subsequent legislation that made it a criminal offence for Ahmadis to refer 
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to themselves as Muslims. In 1984, a group of religious leaders issued an 
ultimatum to the government of military General Zia-ul-Haq, who had 
acceded to power through a military coup in 1977, demanding the immediate 
removal of all Ahmadis from key posts in the state; the arrest of the spiritual 
head of Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan; identification of Ahmadis as 
‘non-Muslims’ on identity cards and passports; and demolition of all places 
of Ahmadiyya worship (Kaushik 1996). The Zia regime, needing no further 
ammunition, immediately promulgated an ordinance that prohibited Ahmadis 
from ‘posing as Muslims’ by using Islamic symbols and nomenclature in 
describing their religion or places of worship, making it a crime punishable 
by death, imprisonment, and/or heavy fines (Pakistan Penal Code 1984). 
Titled the Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and 
Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance (1984), this repressive 
legislation had the effect of making the Ahmadiyya community a target of 
continued harassment, as a result of which the community has retreated 
almost completely from public life in Pakistan, living in continuous terror of 
the state.7 I call this moment the moment of criminalisation of the Ahmadiyya 
community.8 
The Pakistani State and the Formation  
of a New Religious Minority 
While much emphasis has been laid on aspects of Ahmadiyya religious 
thought in theory and practice (Spencer 1974; Friedmann 1989; Gualtieri 
2004) and the documentation of marginalisation of the community by the 
Pakistani state through both legal-constitutional and extra-legal means 
(Gualtieri 1989; Kaushik 1996; Khan 2003), there is no systematic study 
of the socio-political contexts that have given rise at different times to 
different responses by the state towards the religious status of  the Ahmadiyya 
community. 1974 constituted a moment in Pakistan’s history in which the 
margins of the ‘Muslim nation’ were symbolically (re)constructed to exclude 
the Ahmadiyya community from the boundaries of Muslim citizenship. 
As anti-Ahmadiyya agitation continued to grow in 1974, the state was 
confronted with a choice: to revert to its historical precedent of cracking 
down on right-wing establishments to thwart anti-Ahmadiyya demands, or 
to engage somehow with these demands. The first option wasn’t a possibility 
in 1974 for a number of reasons. Firstly, the political climate in 1974 was 
radically different from that in 1954. The socialist government of Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto had been ushered in in 1971, in the wake of Pakistan’s war with 
India that had resulted in Pakistan losing one half of its territory through the 
creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Following this monumental 
event, questions about the very identity of the nation-state of Pakistan 
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resurfaced, which resulted in the socialist regime identifying itself closely 
with Islam. For example, Bhutto characterised his regime as an ‘Islamic 
socialist’ one, and during the 1970s, instituted a number of legislations to 
impose an Islamic moral order.9  This alliance between religion and the left 
would prove crucial for the fate of the Ahmadiyya community. One of the 
first significant manifestations of this alliance, however, was the Constitution 
of 1973, in which Islam for the first time in the history of Pakistan was 
declared the ‘state religion’. 
Secondly, the scale of anti-Ahmadiyya nationalism was much larger in 1974 
than it had been in 1954. Oral accounts of the time period suggest that that 
country was gripped in anti-Ahmadiyya fervour and the pressure on the 
state to act according to popular nationalist demands was intense. Indeed, 
the demands were couched within rhetoric of democracy, with various 
organisations, opposition members, and newspapers demanding that the 
state act in a democratic manner and in accordance with the wishes of the 
majority of the nation. The state response in 1954 was cited as an instance 
of state repression.
In 1953-54, the state’s response to anti-Ahmadiyya nationalist violence 
produced a number of ‘state effects’ through which both state power and 
the idea of the state were institutionalised and articulated (Jessop 1990; 
Trouillot 2001). Firstly, the state in an unprecedented move, that was also 
clearly unconstitutional, by-passed both the elected federal and provincial 
governments, took recourse to martial law thereby institutionalising a 
new language for governance to regulate the body politic in the name of 
the maintenance of law and order. Secondly, while the state engaged with 
the issue of defining the boundaries of ‘Muslim citizenship’, it ultimately 
proposed a territorial, and not a religious, conception of the nation, while 
recognising that the majority of the citizens of Pakistan were Muslim. 
Lastly, the idea that it was the institution of the state, and not those of 
elected representatives, which could most effectively guarantee rights and 
just outcomes in a clash between different ideas about national minorities 
was implicitly professed by the state, with the state distrusting elected 
representatives as being partisan, biased, and intent upon embarrassing the 
state. 
In 1974, all of these aspects were brought under critical scrutiny. This time, 
anti-Ahmadiyya demands were couched within public narratives about 
the  state –  its functions, its ideology, its responsibility to the majority of 
Pakistanis, its relationship to Islam, etc. For example, it was being claimed 
across the board that the basis of the origins of Pakistan were founded on 
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Islam, and that Islam alone provided justification for the existence of an 
independent Pakistan. The history of Pakistan reveals a fundamental tension 
between these two competing ideas about the Pakistani state – Pakistan as 
an Islamic nation-state, meant to serve the Islamic moral community, or 
Pakistan as a liberal-secular state, that at best will pay lip-service to Islam 
but will, for all practical purposes, be divorced from religious precepts 
(Cohen 2004).
Stephen Cohen observes that ‘the most important conflict in Pakistan is 
not a civilisational clash between Muslims and non-Muslims, but a clash 
between different concepts of Islam, particularly how the Pakistani state 
should implement its Islamic identity’ (Cohen 2002:113). Nowhere is this 
more visible than the Pakistani state’s relationship with the Ahmadiyya 
community. The ‘Ahmadi question’ at this moment proved to be the means 
through which the Pakistani state was historically reconstituted, both 
institutionally and discursively, in order to provide a different solution to the 
problem of accommodating Islam within the national narrative. The wider 
social base of the anti-Ahmadiyya nationalism in 1974, coupled with the 
increasing presence of religious rhetoric within the Bhutto regime, created 
the space within which the state was led to revise its earlier position on the 
‘Ahmadi question’. 
In the construction of this new national narrative, the ‘history’ of the 
formation of the Ahmadiyya religion occupied centre stage. One of the most 
vocal and public articulators of the ‘history’ of Ahmadiyya community in 
Pakistan at the time was the journalist and public intellectual Z. A. Suleri, 
who, in a series of articles published in Nawa-e-Waqt, a right-wing Urdu 
language national newspaper, popularised his views. With regard to the birth 
of the Ahmadiyya religion in the late nineteenth century Punjab, Suleri argues 
that the Ahmadiyya religion was given patronage by the British colonial 
authorities because of its anti-Jihadi (Holy War) and pacifist teachings in 
order to create a band of loyal Muslims who did not see it as their religious 
duty to oppose British colonial rule10  (Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 
30th June  1974). In one of his earlier articles, Suleri celebrated the Rabwah 
incident as ‘a blessing in disguise’ for throwing into ‘bold relief the truly 
religious character of Pakistani society’ (Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 
23rd June 1974). A staunch critic of Bhutto and his socialism, Suleri equated 
the religion of the ‘Qadianis’ with the ‘communist materialist creed’, and 
pronounced both an ‘anathema to the Islamic way of life’ (ibid.). Suleri 
argued that the creation of Pakistan was fundamentally premised on Muslim 
nationhood, a position that was rejected by the Ahmadiyya community at the 
time of the Pakistani movement. Furthermore, Suleri argued, Islam alone 
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could offer a unifying point of departure for the nation. It was the failure to 
recognise the fundamental importance of Islam for Pakistan nationhood that 
had led to the separation of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) from Pakistan. 
(Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 23rd June 1974)  
The position that the Ahmadiyya community was linked to foreign elements 
that were antithetical to the Pakistani state was seriously entertained by 
the Pakistani state itself. The proceedings of the tribunal constituted by 
the Punjab government, to be headed by the Lahore High Court Judge 
K.M.A. Samdani, to investigate the disturbances of 29th May , provides an 
especially rich source for analysing how both the Pakistani state and right-
wing nationalists articulated the Ahmadi issue.11 In addition to the state, 
the tribunal allowed different religious organisations and the Ahmadiyya 
community to present their views and testimonies regarding the 29th May 
event. The organisations represented in the tribunal included, among others, 
Jamaat-i-Islami; Majlis-i-Tahaffuz-i-Khatm-i-Nabuwwat (Assembly for 
the Protection of the Finality of Prophethood; MTKN); the Ahmadiyya 
organisation of Rabwah; the Student Union of Talimul Islam College, 
Rabwah, whose students were allegedly responsible for the 29th May attack; 
and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Assembly of the Pakistani Ulama). The 
‘Rabwah Tribunal’ commenced its proceedings on 4th June 1974 and brought 
them to an end on 3rd August 1974. During this inquiry into the 29th May 
incident, the tribunal recorded testimonies of seventy persons, both Ahmadis 
and non-Ahmadis. In addition, some people sent in written records that were 
made part of the tribunal record. Most of the tribunal proceedings were held 
in open court, with newspapers publishing these almost on a daily basis 
(Dawn Newspaper, Karachi: 4th August 1974). While most of the inquiry 
revolved around the 29th May event, questions about the administration 
of Rabwah, the loyalty of the Ahmadiyya community to Pakistan, and its 
religious status and beliefs were also raised and debated. 
Regarding the event itself, different eye-witnesses and participants, both 
Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis were called in to give their account of the event. 
The Ahmadiyya student body maintained that they had been provoked into 
the fight by the NMC students, who at the Rabwah train station earlier on 
22nd May had shouted offensive slogans at the Ahmadiyya students in the 
ground nearby, in addition to verbally sexually harassing a group of girls at 
the station. The NMC students denied these charges, instead claiming that 
the attack had been unprovoked, and that it was the Ahmadiyya students who 
had shouted blasphemous slogans on 22nd May and had tried to distribute 
objectionable Ahmadiyya literature to the NMC students. This line of inquiry 
was mostly concerned with ascertaining the number of attackers, their 
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identities, the methods of attack, the timing and, in short, the logistics of the 
attack. Throughout the inquiries, however, the non-Ahmadiyya side was given 
more space and time to articulate and debate their position. It was charged 
again and again that the attack was pre-planned, unprovoked, authorised by 
the Ahmadiyya administration of Rabwah, and part of a larger strategy to 
overturn Islam and institute the Ahmadiyya religion in Pakistan. 
The religious organisations in fact announced that they were unable to 
represent their case with regard to the complicity of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat 
without debating the larger issue of the religious status of the Ahmadiyya 
community (Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 16th June 1974). Justice 
Samdani asserted that the tribunal’s position was that the Ahmadiyya 
community did form a distinct sect having its own organisational structure, 
and that the issue of the basis of their separateness from the rest of the 
community was relevant to the case. Despite protests by the lawyer of 
the Ahmadiyya Jamaat of Rabwah that the issue of the religious beliefs 
of the community was irrelevant to the case in hand, the tribunal asked 
all the lawyers to prepare written statements regarding the issue of the 
basis of Ahmadiyya separateness (ibid.). While the issue wasn’t openly 
debated during the inquiry, the religious establishments in their concluding 
statements demanded that the tribunal in its final report recommend that the 
community be declared non-Muslim (Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 
4th August 1974). 
While the exact status of the Ahmadiyya community was not discussed, 
the ‘heretical’ and ‘blasphemous’ practices of the community were neatly 
threaded in with discussions about the organisation of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat 
in, and their administration of, Rabwah. Witnesses were brought in who 
gave statements regarding the despotic nature of the Jamaat in Rabwah, 
particularly the close family and associates of the Khalifa – the head of 
the Jamaat and the direct descendent of Ghulam Mirza. For example, a 
Mohammad Saleh Nur, an Ahmadi by birth who was later dislodged from 
Rabwah in 1956, claimed that he and fifty others were shunned that year 
on grounds of making critical statements about the Khalifa (Nawa-e-Waqt 
Newspaper, Lahore: 27th June 1974). In addition to being fired from his 
job, he was made to leave Rabwah without his wife and children, who 
were kept away from him on the grounds that since he was no longer an 
Ahmadi, he had no claim on his Ahmadi family. Several such witnesses 
and ex-Ahmadis were brought in who gave testimonies to the effect that 
the Jamaat had its own system of administration, education, policing, and 
justice, all characterised by despotism and arbitrariness, and which by-passed 
the state altogether. Furthermore, it was stated that the Jamaat had formed 
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quasi-militias in Rabwah that were armed and ready to strike out against 
the ‘Muslims’ in Pakistan, with the help of foreign enemies. For example, 
the lawyers representing the MTKN argued that the 29th May incident was 
a part of a larger ‘Qadiani’ conspiracy to collaborate with India to create a 
‘united India’ in the South Asian sub-continent (Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, 
Lahore: 20th June 1974).  
On 20th August 1974, K.M.A Samdani presented a 112-page report to the 
Punjab government (Dawn Newspaper, Karachi: 21st August 1974), which 
was later passed on to the National Assembly to assist in deliberating the 
‘Ahmadi question’. The contents of the report, along with the National 
Assembly proceedings, have not been made public to this day. The 
proceedings of the tribunal, however, which were open to public viewing 
were being published and sensationalised in newspapers, had the effect of 
creating a paranoiac response among Pakistani nationalists, especially given 
the international context of India’s successful nuclear testing earlier in the 
year and of fresh memories of Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 which was held to 
be the primary cause of the separation of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) 
from Pakistan. In view of intense anti-Ahmadiyya propaganda, coupled with 
the critique of the state that was weaved in through an emerging nationalist 
narrative, the state revised its earlier position that the question of the 
boundaries of Muslim citizenship was a religious and not a political matter. 
Appropriating rhetoric of democracy and Islam, the socialist regime of Prime 
Minister Bhutto gave a new response to the spiritual-symbolic contours of 
the nation in a bid to retain a semblance of legitimacy for the state, thereby 
fundamentally changing the course of state formation in Pakistan.  
Conclusion: Assessing 1974
1974 constituted a moment in Pakistan’s history in which the margins 
of the ‘Muslim nation’ were symbolically (re)constructed to exclude the 
Ahmadiyya community from the boundaries of Muslim citizenship. I have 
examined the tribunal investigations of the Lahore High Court to show 
how the Ahmadiyya community was symbolically constructed not only as 
heretic but also as disloyal and traitorous, the enemy within, which had to 
be curbed by the state in order for the dream of independence from colonial 
rule to be realised. In an important sense therefore, the Ahmadiyya issue is 
fundamentally a post-colonial one, where the ‘post’ implies that the present 
can only be understood in relation to the (perceived) past. In the ‘state space’ 
constituted by the tribunal investigations, what was questioned was not only 
the religious status of the Ahmadiyya community, but also the role of the 
nation-state in curbing the threat to the moral community of the nation. The 
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second constitutional amendment of Pakistan, arrived at through supposedly 
democratic means (since the issue was eventually decided on by the elected 
majority in the National Assembly12 ), recalls Giorgio Agamben’s thesis that 
the subjection of biological life to authoritarian and illiberal practices of 
death, torture, and exclusion emerges from the very core of, or is the very 
basis of, the liberal democratic order (Agamben 1998). The use of law to 
legally enact sanctions against the Ahmadiyya community served to re-
situate the state as the primary institution of moral regulation (Corrigan and 
Sayer 1985), with the power to articulate and instate the ‘exception’, which, 
according to Agamben, is always founded upon the exclusion of ‘bare life’, 
or simple biological life, the figure of which is historically varying. In the 
case of the Pakistani state, this figure came to be embodied by the Islamic 
‘heretic’ who quite literally had to be disciplined into shedding Islamic 
symbols from their public religious practices. Furthermore, the events 
leading up to the amendment throw light on the ways in which the question 
of boundaries – between the centre and periphery, public and private, lawful 
and un-lawful – were debated, re-drawn, and re-inscribed in the nationalist 
narrative. A focus on the historical constitution of such boundaries, especially 
through a focus on the ‘margins’ suggests, as Das and Poole observe, that 
‘such margins are a necessary entailment of the state, much as the exception 
is a necessary component of the rule’ (Das and Poole 2004:4). 
The Pakistani state has, over the course of its history, negotiated the question 
of the boundaries of the Pakistani nation in different ways at different times. 
The key to answering this question of the state’s changing relationship to Islam 
in defining the contours of ‘Muslim citizenship’ cannot simply be located by 
looking at articulations of nationalism in the body politic and locating the 
symbolic construction and institutional discrimination of minorities in the 
‘evils’ present in all modern nationalisms (Kedourie 1960), more specifically 
religious or ethnic-based nationalisms. Scholarship that engages with public 
visibility of Islam in states such as Pakistan by attributing it to a lack of 
secularisation ends up regarding ‘Islam’ as a monolithic religion supporting 
an ahistorical system of thought that is perceived to be easily locatable 
through a highly limited nexus of ‘Islamic’ discourses and practices. The 
main problem with this position is that even the most seemingly entrenched 
and doctrinal Islamic laws in fact are socially constructed and emerge from 
historical contexts of power relationships and social structures of authority 
and domination (Zubaida 2004). Thus, the dichotomy between religious and 
secular discourses is misleading since so-called secular discourses may be 
intimately informed by religious motivations while religious texts always go 
through interpretation and human agency (An-Na’im 1995). Rather, I have 
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argued for the importance of examining how the very idea of the Pakistani 
state, and especially its relationship to the ‘heretic’ others of the Pakistani 
Muslims, was contested and negotiated by different actors in the imagined 
political community of the nation. 
Notes
1 The interpretation of the amended clause 260 (3) read as follows: 
In the Constitution and all enactments and other legal instruments, unless 
there is anything repugnant in the subject or context 
(a) ‘Muslim’ means a person who believes in the unity and oneness 
of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the 
Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, 
and does not believe in, or recognise as a prophet or religious reformer, 
any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the 
word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be 
upon him); and 
(b) ‘non-Muslim’ means a person who is not a Muslim and includes 
a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi 
community, a person of the Quadiani Group or the Lahori Group who 
call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name or a Bahai, and a person 
belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes. (Constitution of Pakistan 
1974)
2 See Friedman (1989) for an appraisal of Ahmadiyya religious thought.
3 Virtually from the beginning of their formation in 1931, the Ahrars had launched a public 
anti-Ahmadi campaign, demanding in 1934 that the community be declared outside the pale 
of Islam and that no Ahmadi be appointed to a public office, the latter being a direct reference 
to Zafarullah Khan, a prominent Ahmadi personality who was later appointed the first Foreign 
Minister of Pakistan. In this, the Ahrar party was ideologically close to the Punjab wing 
of the Muslim League, which too had declared the Ahmadiyya community non-Muslim 
and barred them from membership, even though the central wing of the League remained 
evasive on the issue (Friedman 1989: 37-38). During the anti-colonial movement, the Ahrar 
Party eventually aligned itself with the Indian National Congress and openly opposed the 
movement for the creation of an independent Pakistan. 
4 Quoted in Rashid Tasir, Tahrik-i-hurriyat-l Kashmir. Vol. 2. Srinagar: Muhafiz Publications, 
1973, p. 291 (translated by author). Revisionist historiography on Jinnah is increasingly 
beginning to challenge the Pakistani state’s narrative of Jinnah as committed to an independent 
state of Pakistan. For example, Ayesha Jalal (1985) argues that Jinnah did not abandon the 
image of India as a homeland for both Hindus and Muslims until 1946. Other scholars have 
showed that the vision of the Pakistani state that Jinnah envisioned was premised on a secular 
constitutional-democratic order (Ahmed 1997). 
5 Despite their decision to move to Pakistan after the partition, the Ahmadiyya community 
remained ambiguous and fearful towards the prospect of an independent Pakistan until the 
very end, as can be witnessed by the community’s decision to avoid settling in major cities, 
where they would have become the sure targets of right-wing militant organisations. Instead, 
the community chose to settle in Rabwah, an undeveloped land situated ninety-five miles west 
of Lahore bought from the government, and soon declared it to be their spiritual headquarters 
in the world. Here, the community proceeded to set up its own administrative, educational, 
and social infrastructure with relative autonomy until 1974, when this autonomy, and its 
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attendant institutions, were brought under crucial scrutiny by the state. 
6 See Dawn Newspaper, Karachi dated 1st June 1974 and 5th June 1974 for Punjab Chief 
Minister Hanif Ramay’s initial public statements on the Rabwah incident to this effect. 
7 A number of NGOs have been documenting the severe breach of human rights with regard 
to the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan. These include the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Visit www.thepersecution.
org for an excellent overview of the reports published by these NGOs. 
8 The Ahmadiyya community challenged the ordinance in the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) 
on the grounds that it was against the injunctions of Islam and that it violated fundamental 
rights. The FSC Bench after lengthy deliberations declined the petition, arguing that the 
1984 ordinance was in accordance with Islamic laws and principles. The Ahmadiyya 
community in turn challenged the FSC ruling in the Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan where 
too the petition was defeated. The repressive ordinance of 1984 had the effect of making the 
Ahmadiyya community a target of continued harassment, as a result of which the community 
has retreated almost completely from public life in Pakistan. Countless number of people, 
both Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis, have been brought to local courts on grounds of blasphemy 
and for ‘posing as Muslims’ and have been put into jails and tortured while they awaited 
court decisions. The rights of assembly, expression, and speech have been curtailed by the 
state on countless occasions, most famously in 1989 when the Ahmadiyya community was 
banned from celebrating the 100 year anniversary of their religion. Again, this decision was 
challenged by the Ahmadiyya community in the Lahore High Court, where the appeal was 
dismissed. 
9 See Burki (1988) for an overview of political and social developments in Pakistan under 
Bhutto’s regime. 
10 The editorial of Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper (Lahore) unequivocally argued that the ‘Ahmadi 
problem’ was a legacy and a reminder of colonial rule, and the problem would never have 
arisen if the Muslims had not been colonised. The editorial argues that under Muslim rule, 
no person would have dared to claim prophethood, for they would have known that such 
claims would not be tolerated (Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 2nd July 1974). Suleri’s 
article in the same newspaper, in which he celebrated the passing of the second constitutional 
amendment, was tilted ‘British Killed Today!’ (Nawa-e-Waqt Newspaper, Lahore: 13th 
September 1974, translated by author)
11 The ‘Rabwah Tribunal’ commenced its proceedings on 4th June 1974 and brought them 
to an end on 3rd August 1974. During this inquiry into the 29th May incident, the tribunal 
recorded evidence of seventy persons, both Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis. In addition, some 
people sent in written records that were made part of the tribunal record. Most of the tribunal 
proceedings were held in open court, with newspapers publishing these almost on a daily 
basis (Dawn Newspaper, Karachi: 4th August 1974). 
12 Dawn, the widest circulating English language newspaper in Pakistan, hailed the incidence 
of democratic triumph, observing that ‘The manner in which the decision was taken augers 
well for the growth of democracy in the country. Constitutionality is the breath of life in a 
democracy. The same decision coming as an official decree would not have meant the same 
thing.’ (Dawn Newspaper, Karachi: 10th September 1974) 
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